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Intersectionality 
By Natalie Wong Jiayi
 Gender inequality is not equal
I am not even equal  
To the sum of my parts which is not 
and never is equal 
To you: 
My skin is not peelable, but I/we 
peel it anyway 
Orange skin or organic skin – peel 
Can you tell the difference?  
I move too quickly for the 
patriarchy you to tell the difference 
Slap/silence me anyway 
But not in the same way as you do 
her  
If I listen, I am obedient; 
Honourable. 
If I listen but don’t follow through I 
am not obedient. 
If I don’t listen but follow through I 
am disobedient. 
Listen to me now: 
Stop telling me what I can(not) do 
What I should(not) look like 
What I would be if I just  
Stop for a moment and listen 
To another man, another ad.  
Switch state. 
(Do) I (do) have to escape  
But it is my mind 
So it is mine 
I have to destroy 
My body and 
My mind is no longer mine 
How far can I run within the corners 
of my mind 
Within the corners of this earth 
Where is my place find me 
My place 
 
I have no place to escape 
Introduction
Before starting this reflective essay, 
I acknowledge that the work of 
feminist anthropologists is not 
timeless and covers a vast range of 
ideas such that I do not assert that my 
learning condensed here is in any way 
exhaustive. The poem I wrote below 
speaks to the unevenness of inequality, 
focusing on intersectionality, multiple 
axes of gendered inequality, and 
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Intersectionality and the 
Socially Constructed “Skin”
In my poem, I wrote ‘gender inequality 
is not equal’ (L1) because the way that 
various aspects of an individual (‘the 
sum of my parts’) (L3) – race, gender, 
class, social and historical contexts – 
are given social meaning and how the 
positions individuals have within various 
hierarchies affect individuals differently. 
I found this crucially important to 
understand any form of inequality. We 
must holistically analyse the various 
inequalities that intersect, compound and 
asymmetrically amplify the experience of 
exclusion and oppression of individuals 
and communities. 
I found that Elizabeth Chin’s (1999) 
Ethnically Correct Dolls: Toying with 
the Sex Industry provided a good model 
to understand inequality through 
intersectionality. It gave a clear example of 
the importance of intersectionality when 
adopting measures to address inequality. I 
found it extremely frustrating to read that 
in an attempt to ‘address the problem of 
minority representation’ (Chin 1999:305), 
Mattel’s black Shani dolls not only failed 
to address inequality and exclusion, but 
instead cemented it further. The dolls 
could ‘only incompletely embody the 
experiences of kids who are not simply 
racial beings, but also poor, working class, 
young, ghettoized, and gendered’ (Chin 
1999:306). The failure of the Shani dolls 
stemmed not only from their inability 
to address the other axes of inequalities 
that the children faced, but also cemented 
and reproduced the exoticisation and 
idealised stereotypical features of minority 
groups. I could not comprehend how large 
companies like Mattel could fail repeatedly 
over the years - not just in this instance of 
the black Shani dolls but in various ‘ethnic’ 
or ‘world’ Barbies - to close the gap and fill 
the missing spaces of other ethnic groups 
in the toy industry. Mattel also poorly 
represented my own ethnic group in their 
2004 depiction of a ‘Chinoiserie’ Barbie 
scantily clad in a ‘pyjama suit’ (Figure 1) 
with stereotypically smaller eyes (Mattel 
2020). The “China Barbie Doll”, released in 
2011, had a product description ‘Ni hao! 
That’s how I say hello!’ (Mattel 2020). This 
made me question how much sincerity 
Mattel invested in its effort to bridge 
the minority gap when the dolls they 
produced bordered on racist. 
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Instead of confronting race as a social 
construct and subjective experience, 
Mattel’s dolls emphasised race based on 
physical features and cemented idealistic, 
stereotypical imaginings of the featured 
minority groups. While I acknowledge 
that there was an attempt to include 
different ethnic groups, the dolls drew 
on Western notions of race as based 
on ‘difference and phenotype’ (Chin 
1995:308) and ‘[reproduced] the error of 
misplaced concreteness’ (Chin 1995:307). 
The obsession with locating racial 
difference only in physical, visible markers 
obscures how these features are imbued 
with socially constructed symbolic 
meaning to signify race. This made me 
think of how, despite progressive changes, 
many still base ideas of sex and gender on 
dominant hegemonic ideas of masculinity 
and femininity, greatly emphasising the 
divide between the two. These ideas and 
symbols are meaningful only insofar as we 
give meaning and significance to them. 
However symbolic or immaterial 
‘social constructs’ may seem, they have 
concrete and material consequences for 
the reality of individuals living within 
hierarchical structures that exclude and 
oppress them. I also found it disturbing 
that the underlying discourse/idea of the 
‘ethnically correct’ dolls was based on an 
inverted logic that ‘toys … are responsible 
for the children’s perceptions [self-hatred 
and racism], not the society that produces 
them’ (Chin 1991:310). Disturbed as 
it made me feel, is this not the hyper-
consumerist world we live in? From 
commercial products to social media, 
material things have become part of our 
understanding of self and a tool for social 
relations. While social media appears to 
focus more on social interaction than 
dolls, I felt that the underlying trend is 
similar. Both fundamentally present an 
idealised ‘Other’ or ‘Self ’. Social media 
has been transformed, engineered, and 
monetised to more than just allowing 
social connection, it has cemented 
idealised versions of both Other and 
Self. Similarly for gendered inequalities, 
when unmanaged, the individual 
could internalise comments about 
their supposed ‘failure’ to emulate the 
perfectly gendered body based on ideas 
of femininity and masculinity. It is on the 
‘skin’ and body that socially constructed 
ideas of race, gender and other 
inequalities are marked. Scientifically, 
the ‘skin is not peelable’ (L5), in a sense 
that physically it is difficult for us to peel 
away the characteristics that are socially 
imbued with meaning, but ‘I/we peel it 
anyway’ speaks to our resistance and the 
malleability of these socially constructed 
meanings and inequalities. 
Multiple Axes of Gendered 
Inequality
In the poem I underlined ‘the patriarchy’ 
to show how the dominant understanding 
(even my own, prior to reading more 
widely feminist anthropological texts) is 
rooted in male dominance over female 
submission and the heteronormativity 
bias. I cancelled out ‘the patriarchy’ and 
used ‘you’ instead to recentre the focus 
to understand varied forms of gendered 
inequality present in other relationships 
and settings. I admit I do not fully 
understand how gendered inequality 
permeates and works in all various arenas 
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and relationships, but here I attempt 
to reflect on (1) how we can question 
dominant Western assumptions, and (2) 
the role of the state in producing and 
perpetuating gendered inequalities. 
Divergence from a Singular 
Western Gaze
I found Strathern’s 1984 text on women 
and exchange in Highlands New Guinea 
helpful and important as she advocated 
different models of thinking. She showed 
how the Western understanding of the 
subject:object dichotomy was too fixed in 
ideas of personhood, agency and ‘control 
over the product of [the individual’s] own 
labour’ (Strathern 1984:162, emphasis 
added), or the lack of it to fully analyse 
the exchange of women and their labour. 
Women, regarded as ‘valuables … are not 
always treated as objects in the Western 
sense, [and] are not to be understood 
as ‘property’ if property entails 
objectification’ (Strathern 1984:164). 
Regardless of how convinced I was of her 
narration of the Hagen model of thought, 
I found the underlying principle more 
important and crucial. I feel that as an 
anthropologist investigating any society, 
we have a moral and ethical responsibility 
to our interlocutors and their society 
to portray their understandings as 
accurately as possible and utilise their 
ways of thinking to understand their 
society. While it is impossible to neutralise 
our thought from cultural biases, it is 
important to recognise and be open to 
local ways of thinking. My anxiety of how 
we would truly know what inequality 
looks like in a society (let alone measure 
it) is soothed only by Leacock’s repeated 
emphasis on the importance of analysing 
‘qualitatively different relations’ 
(1992:225, emphasis added), rather than 
quantitatively measuring inequality. I 
find this extremely important for fear we 
reproduce an added layer of inequality 
through our anthropological text, 
positioning our voice over that of the 
‘Other’.
State Control over Women’s, 
but Not Men’s, Bodies
After reading more feminist 
anthropological texts, I felt that my 
understanding of patriarchy was the 
centrepiece of gendered inequality. 
Reading Hill Gates’ 1989 study of late 
imperial China, I saw how the patriarchy 
had social, political, and material 
consequences on the lives of Chinese 
women. 
While there is much more that Gates 
has covered in the text, I focused on 
her analysis of Chinese characters. She 
points out that the family (家 jia) was 
a ‘microcosm of the great guojia [国
家] or “nation-family”’ (Gates 1989:801, 
Chinese characters added). I included 
the simplified Chinese character (国家) 
because in contrast to the traditional 
Chinese writing, 國家, each seemed 
to suggest different nuances. Chinese 
characters each have their individual 
meanings and strokes which are not 
arbitrary but can be an amalgamation of 
different characters or visually represent 
an idea. While Gates focused on the 
second character (家) which means 
family, I found the first character to be of 
just as much significance. The traditional 
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version (國家) has the character 域 
within it, which refers to fief or land. 
Compared to the simplified version (国
家) which includes the character 王or 玉, 
which means King and jade respectively, 
this implies ideas of patriarchy and 
wealth more directly than ‘fief ’ or ‘land’. 
While there may not be much concrete 
significance or symbolism here, I found it 
interesting that in ancient Imperial China, 
patriarchal ideas were conflated with the 
state and family, despite it not featuring 
prominently in writing. Simplified 
Chinese was only established in 1949, 
after the Republican Revolution ended the 
reign of the last Emperor. While the ideas 
of patriarchy appeared less authoritative, 
as there was no longer an emperor with 
a heavenly mandate to dictate cultural 
norms and rule of law, fundamental ideas 
of the state control over women’s bodies 
were still heavily influential.
For me, the most profound/disturbing 
concept, also echoed in other feminist 
anthropological readings, is the control 
of the body by the state, indirectly or 
directly. In late imperial China, ‘the 
pressure on women to bear sons was 
especially intense’, because males provided 
a labour force and brought capital for the 
family, and ‘[g]ood women submit, always 
to male authority’ (Gates 1989:813). The 
state promoted cultural value systems 
which enforced ‘women’s submission to 
extreme pronatalism as well as to labor 
discipline’ (Gates 1989:818). In 1979, 
China introduced the one-child policy 
in order to curb China’s rapidly growing 
population. It still remained that boys 
were favoured over girls. This policy sat 
on the other extreme end of the spectrum 
of state control over the sexual bodies of 
women – they may only have one child, 
and that child should be male. 
This also brought to mind Roberts’ (2012) 
description of Ecuadorian women’s 
body being in an indirect relationship 
with the state. I felt that the examples 
of Chinese and Ecuadorian women 
presented both ends of the spectrum 
of Foucault’s (1977) idea of the body as 
subject to technical disciplinary processes 
and management such that the social 
and political norms are embodied and 
embedded within the self-disciplining 
body (McVeigh 1997:217, in Ashikari 
2003:7). Women in imperial China were 
disciplined by the state and wider social 
and economic norms to produce more 
children. In contrast, Ecuadorians tried 
to distance themselves from the state and 
public care, which was marked by the 
caesarean section scar, which symbolised 
‘upward mobility …  [and that] they 
could not give birth “normally”, that 
they had the means to overcome their 
dysfunction, and that they were not 
made subject to state neglect in public 
medical facilities’ (Roberts 2012:233). 
However, I understood this act in itself 
as a self-disciplining act that reproduced 
gendered inequality, since ‘[e]lite men’s 
bodies remain potent while caesarean 
section disciplines and limits elite women 
to two children’ (Roberts 2012:221). 
Despite the caesarean section scar being 
seen by the women as Whitening and 
differentiating themselves ‘from their 
browner, poorer empleadas’ (Roberts 
2012:225), I could not help but think that 
while they succeeded in securing a better 
position along the racial/class hierarchy 
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and resisted the control of the state over 
their bodies, they reproduced gendered 
inequalities. Women’s bodies had to be 
invaded, while men’s remained untouched. 
Resistance
In this final section, I reflect on the 
different modes of resistance – whether 
they are a ‘resistive resilience’ or 
an internalisation of the gendered 
inequalities. Mikiko Ashikari’s fieldwork 
of middle-class Japanese women in 
1996-1997 showed how resistance against 
the dominant ‘ideological division by 
gender – soto (outside the home)/men 
and uchi (home)/women’ (Ashikari 
2003:4), involved balancing resistance and 
accommodating what is ‘proper, normal’ 
(Ashikari 2003:23). I found the concept 
of ‘multiplicity of selves, subjectivities 
and identities’ particularly helpful in 
seeing forms of resistance not as a 
straightforward defiance, but a calculated 
act and risk, where the individual also 
had to perform and behave within the 
dominant gender discourse in order to 
negotiate the benefits that arise from 
power structures. ‘Wild’ women acted 
in ways which resisted the dominant 
gender ideology, but ‘[w]hen they go 
to work, they wear the standard color 
of foundation, instead of a darker tone, 
even though their bodies are now tanned’ 
(Ashikari 2003:25). This was necessary 
to ‘negotiate better positions within 
gender relations’ and also ‘accommodate 
to soto by taking a subject position of 
“subordinated women”, [to] gain power 
over men’ (Ashikari 2003:20). I felt that 
this reflected ‘resistive resistance’, a term 
I use to allude to the idea that resistance 
does not always entail or portray itself 
as an extreme deviation or rejection of 
the dominant ideology that underlies 
gendered inequalities. It was about 
nuanced, calculated resistance, and 
knowing when certain actions were 
effective and appropriate in ultimately 
negotiating better social positions, 
rather than to be taken as a passive 
internalisation of the discourse. 
In contrast, cosmetic surgery done by 
Asian-American women featured in a 
study by Eugenia Kaw (1991) left me 
confused and frustrated – I could not 
discern whether the cosmetic surgery 
was truly done in resistance to the 
‘patriarchal definitions of femininity 
and to Caucasian standards of beauty’ 
(Bordo 1990 in Kaw 1991:78), or as an 
internalisation of these discourses. I 
also found it problematic that despite 
her interlocutors saying that ‘they are 
“proud to be Asian American” and that 
they “do not want to look white”’, Kaw 
insists that their cosmetic surgeries were 
a ‘potent form of self, body and society 
alienation’ (Kaw 1991:77) and evidence 
of ‘[motivations] by a racial ideology 
that infers negative behavioural or 
intellectual characteristics from a group’s 
genetic facial features’ (1991:79). Hence, 
I thought that the ethnographic material 
Kaw drew on did not correspond directly 
with her inferences and analysis. As 
Asian myself, we are fed a diet of the 
standard ideals of beauty, but while it 
does not always necessarily imply that 
should we actively choose to pursue these 
goals, it must mean that we are passively 
internalising racialised and gendered 
beauty ideals. Furthermore, I found that 
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Kaw’s line of argument and criticism of 
the surgeries, seen by her as ‘not … a 
celebration of their [own] bodies’, echoed 
ideas raised by Pitts-Taylor (2003) in her 
work on bodily modifications and various 
feminist viewpoints. Radical feminists 
argue that body modifications ‘violate the 
body and reproduce oppressive relations 
of power by echoing patriarchal violence’ 
(Pitts-Taylor 2003: 73). They seem to 
suggest that the ‘pristine, natural, organic 
body – a body unmolested by culture – 
would be a primary resource for resisting 
patriarchy’ (Pitts-Taylor 2003:54).  
These two ideas left me feeling defeated, 
hence the line ‘Orange skin or organic 
skin – peel / Can you tell the difference?’ 
(poem L5-6). Orange skin depicts the/my 
Asian face, while organic skin represented 
the organic, natural body that radical 
feminists argue must be left untouched. 
My frustration arises because even when 
Asian women try to negotiate a better 
social position within racial and gendered 
hierarchies - no matter how superficial 
it may seem - through enhancing their 
beauty, their act of resistance is then 
subverted and criticised as ‘not organic’ 
or an internalisation of the hegemonic 
discourse. My frustration is – can you tell 
the difference anyway? What we choose 
to do with our bodies again comes under 
the criticism and gaze ‘what I can(not) do 
/ What I should(not) look like’ (L15-16). 
Is this not a reproduction of the gendered 
inequality in discourse? 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the work of feminist 
anthropology on gendered inequality has 
made me realise that the various axes 
of inequality intersect asymmetrically 
and produce vastly different experiences 
of exclusion and oppression. Feminist 
anthropology on gendered inequality has 
also given me the vocabulary and tools 
to analyse gendered inequalities and 
locate them in relations and situations 
other than just the patriarchy and 
conjugal relationships. While I found 
the notions of the ‘idealised Other’ 
and ‘Self ’ based on physical traits to be 
frustratingly intractable in the discourse 
and practice of gendered inequality, I 
also felt hopeful when reading about 
various resistive practices. Perhaps it 
is time to shift the discourse from one 
of reducing exclusion to increasing 
inclusion. This entails actively taking into 
consideration local models of thinking 
to analyse gendered inequalities and 
resistive corporeal practices. I found it 
paramount to empathetically understand 
the conditions and limitations in which 
the women found courage and space to 
engage in resistive practices. While there 
is more to be said on the limitations 
and effectiveness of these practices, I 
found that framing resistive practices 
in certain ways could either empower 
or reproduce structures of inequality. 
Hence, reading the works of feminist 
anthropologists helped me to understand 
gendered inequalities through multiple 
perspectives, but also left me frustrated 
when nuances were not fully taken into 
consideration. 
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